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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEGER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERTS, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
Defendant-Added. 
CASE NO. 13737 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant, Leger Construction Company [Leger] 
commenced this action against defendant-respondent, Roberts, 
Inc. [Roberts], claiming $2,782.00 allegedly due Leger from 
Roberts under the terms of a subcontract whereby Roberts had 
agreed to perform mechanical work on Utah State maintenance 
stations located at Salt Lake City and Manila, Utah. Roberts 
(1) counterclaimed for $14,172.04 owed to it under the con-
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tract, plus interest and attorney's fees; (2) joined Leger's 
surety, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company [USF&G] 
as an added defendant; and (3) claimed $3,249.77 due from 
Leger on other jobs. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, 
District Judge, who filed a memorandum decision. Thereafter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered. A 
joint and several judgment was entered against plaintiff and 
its surety on defendants first claim in the sum of $8,494.95, 
and against plaintiff only on defendant's second claim for 
$782.25. Motions were made by plaintiff and defendant to 
amend the findings and conclusions, make additional findings 
and conclusions and amend the judgment accordingly. Plain-
tiff's motions were denied and defendant's motion was granted 
to award it attorney's fees of $2,607.50 against plaintiff 
and the surety on defendant's first claim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment 
of the District Court. 
It should be noted that plaintiff seeks a reversal 
". . . for and on behalf of its surety • . ." (Appellant's 
Brief P. 2). However, USF&G has not filed a notice of 
-2-
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appeal and it is respondent's contention that the judgment 
against it is final. This matter will be treated in respon-
dent's argument. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in appellant's brief is not 
complete, failing to include much of the pertinent evidence 
upon which the trial court's decision was based. For that 
reason, respondent will state the facts as it sees them in 
the record. 
Leger and Roberts entered into a contract entitled "Bid 
and Contract" dated August 9, 1971 (Exhibit 2-P), under which 
Roberts was to perform mechanical and plumbing work on 
maintenance stations at Salt Lake City and Manila, Utah. 
The contract price was $70,591.00. The maintenance stations 
were owned by the Utah State Building Board and were to be 
used by the Utah State Highway Department (Exhibit 22-P). In 
connection with its contract with the Building Board, Leger, 
as principal, and USF&G, as surety, executed and delivered 
to the State of Utah a labor and material payment bond 
pursuant to the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 
5, U.C.A. 1953 (as amended). (Finding of Fact No. 5). 
Although the agreement between Leger and Roberts was 
dated August 9, 1971, both George L. Leger, president of 
•. ' - • •
 :
-' ' .
 ;
- ' . - .
:
- • • " ' • ' • . . ' i f 
, • . • • \ 
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Leger, and Larry P. Roberts, president of Roberts, agree 
that the document was actually signed a week or more after 
the ninth (Tr. 1st day, p. 7; Tr. 2nd day, p. 66). 
Under the contract (Exhibit 2-P) Roberts agreed to: 
. . . actually move onto the job, with all 
necessary tools, supplies and equipment, 
within (2) two working days after receiving 
written or oral notice and to start and car-
ry on the work uninterrupted to completion 
of the stage directed by the general contrac-
tor. 
Roberts commenced work on the Salt Lake maintenance station 
on August 4, 1971, five days prior to the date on the con-
tract (Exhibit 17-P). The first work noted on Roberts' daily 
log (Exhibit 17-P) on the Manila maintenance station was 
September 7, 1971. Larry Roberts, however, testified that he 
took material to that job one day after Ned Oaks, Leger's 
foreman, requested the material in the latter part of August, 
1971. George L. Leger testified that the Manila job was 
ready for installation of certain radiant heating pads on 
September 4, 1971 (a Saturday), that Roberts was "aware of 
that fact on the 4th" and that the work was not commenced 
until September 14, 1971 (Tr. 1st day, p. 50). As noted 
above, Roberts1 daily log shows that its employees were on 
the Manila job on Tuesday, September 7, which was the first 
working day after September 4 since Monday, September 6 was 
Labor Day. 
-4-
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According to George L. Leger, the major portions of 
the work to be performed by Roberts consisted of the in-
stallation of underground piping and of radiant heating 
pads (Tr. 1st day, p. 10). Installation of the radiant 
heating pads was commenced at the Salt Lake job on October 
9, 1971 (Finding of Fact No. 36) . George Leger maintained 
that the Salt Lake project was ready for this pad on August 
27, 1971, and that Roberts was so informed (Tr. 1st day, 
p. 10). The evidence shows that employees of Roberts spent 
136.5 man hours on the Salt Lake job between August 27 and 
October 8, 1971 (Exhibit P-17). These radiant heating pads 
were complete by November 11, 1971, but primarily because 
of leaking valves the system was not finished until Decem-
ber 5, 1971 (Finding of Fact No. 36). These valves were 
specified in the plans and specifications furnished to 
Roberts (Finding of Fact No. 46). 
The weather conditions during this period hampered 
completion of the pads (Tr. 2nd day, p. 37). In fact, Tom 
Patterson, the mechanical inspector for the Utah State 
Building Board, even suggested that Roberts wait until the 
roof was on the building before completing the pads (Tr. 2nd 
day, p. 37). As of November 22, 1971, the structural steel 
upon which the roof was to be placed was complete (Tr. 1st 
-5-
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day, p. 65), but zero percent of the roof itself was complete 
on that date (Exhibit 1.2-D) . According to the "Draw Request" 
submitted to the Utah State Building Board by Leger and 
signed by George L. Leger, no work had been done on the 
roofing and sheet metal, drywall, ceramic tile, floor cover-
ing, flat concrete, overhead doors, locker and toilet parti-
tions, fence, landscaping, hoist, painting and calking as of 
November 22 (Exhibit 12-D). The electrical was 35% complete, 
hollow metal and hardware 10%, windows, glass and glazing 
60%, pump equipment 40%, building material 60%, and carpen-
ter labor 65% (Exhibit 12-D). Roberts1 mechanical work was 7 
complete (Exhibit 12-D). It was obvious at that time that 
the job was not going to be finished by November 30, 1971. 
At trial, George L. Leger, on cross-examination, ad-
mitted that Roberts did not prevent the roof from being in-
stalled (Tr. 1st day, p. 65). He said that the rough plumb-
ing, boiler, gas pump, water line, and toilet facilities, 
all installed by Roberts, did not hold up the job (Tr. 1st 
day, pp. 65-67). At that point the trial judge asked George 
Leger "Is it your claim the delay is based solely upon the 
heating pad?" To which Leger answered: "Yes, sir." 
Appellant goes to great lengths in its brief in an 
attempt to show that Roberts did not diligently pursue its 
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work on the Salt Lake job from October 27, through the 
end of November, 1971. Appellant claims that the weather 
records show rain on only eleven days during this period -
five of which were either Saturdays or Sundays (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 7). What appellant overlooks in his persual of 
the weather report (Exhibit 46-P) is that on October 27, 
5.8 inches of snow fell and that snow continued to fall so 
that on the 28th day there were 6 inches on the ground; on 
the 29th, 2 inches; and on the 30th (Saturday), 2 inches. 
Again on October 31 (Sunday), 8.5 inches of snow fell so 
that on November 1, 7 inches were on the ground; 5 inches 
on the 2nd; 3 inches on the 3rd; and 2 inches on the 4th 
(Exhibit 46-P). In fact the records of the Utah State 
Building Board (Exhibit 48-P) show that only Roberts was 
on the job on October 28 and that the next work done by 
anyone was on November 8, 1971. Obviously there was suf-
ficient evidence upon which the trial court could find that 
the weather delayed progress on the job during this period. 
Eliminating the first seven days of November, only 16 work-
ing days remained in the month and an examination of Exhi-
bits 17-P (Roberts' records) and 48-P (the Building Board's 
record) shows that Roberts had men on the job for eight of 
those days, for a total of 64 man hours. Exhibit 48-P also 
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shows that no one worked on the job on Friday, November 26, 
the day after Thanksgiving. Four inches of snow fell on 
November 14 (Exhibit 46--P) . 
Although George Leger testified that the Salt Lake 
project was ready for installation of the radiant heating 
pads on August 27, 1971, (Tr. 1st day, p. 10), Larry Roberts 
testified that he took photographs of the site on October 
10, 1971 (Exhibits 30-36D) and the earth was not in a con-
dition which would enable Roberts to install its pipe at 
that time (Tr. 2nd day, p. 76). In fact, Roberts had to 
remove pipe which had already been installed in order for 
Leger to "get in and do the final grade." (Tr. 2nd day, p. 
76) ; - ; - ' : -v> : : S--; ; : ^-;: 
Certain back charges were made by the Utah State Build-
ing Board against Leger on account of mechanical work at 
the Salt Lake shed. These included $2,633.00 for a gas 
line which was installed by Mountain Fuel Supply and which 
was paid for by the Building Board (Finding of Fact No. 24, R. 
p. 33). A dispute existed as to who was responsible for 
installation of this line and two or three meetings with 
state officials did not resolve the dispute (Finding of Fact 
No. 27, R. p. 35). The trial court found that the gas line 
was Roberts1 responsibility and allowed Leger an offset for 
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the cost (Finding of Fact No. 24, R. pp. 33-34). 
Similarly, the installation of "plug valves" and a 
stack which did not meet specifications was taken into 
consideration by the trial court and offsets totaling 
$584.22 against the balance due Roberts allowed (Findings of 
Fact Nos. 20 & 23, R. pp. 32 & 33). 
When Roberts was not paid the balance of the contract 
price, it refused to do certain warranty work and the trial 
court allowed Leger to offset $268.70 because of this (Find-
ing of Fact No. 22, R. p. 33). 
The radiant heating pad at Manila was complete on Octo-
ber 15, 1971 (Tr. 1st day, p. 50). Thereafter, Leger poured 
the concrete for the floors and then progress on the job 
". . . pretty well stopped . . . " according to George Leger 
because of a bad snow storm (Tr. 1st day, p. 51). Very little 
was done on that job until December 1, 1971, at which time 
Leger commenced the framing of the office area (Tr. 1st day, 
pp. 51-52). 
Respondent also claimed monies from Leger (but not from 
USF&G) on a number of other jobs. The trial court awarded 
$782.25 on these claims (R. p. 26) and appellant apparently 
does not dispute this award. 
• 1 
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ARGUMENT 
•• I • • 
THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
ROBERTS AND LEGER IS INVALID AS A PENALTY* 
Paragraph "(p)" of the contract between plaintiff and 
defendant (see Ex. 3-P), provided: 
The work shall be commenced upon written 
or oral order to proceed and completed within 
the time stated in this bid. If the work is 
not completed in accordance with the foregoing, 
it is understood that the general contractor 
will suffer damage and it being impractical and 
unfeasible to determine the amount of actual 
damage, it is agreed that I will pay on demand, 
to the general contractor, as fixed and liqui-
dated damages and not as penalty, the sum of 
$50.00 for each calendar day of delay until 
the work is completed and accepted. Extension 
of time shall be granted, when asked for in 
writing, when it is, in the judgment of the 
general contractor, not practical or impossible 
or because of unforeseeable causes beyond con-
trol and without fault or negligence on my be-
half, to complete said work in the specified 
time. (Above causes including but not restric-
ted to strikes, war, acts of God, acts of the 
Government, acts of the owner, acts of another 
contractor in the performance of a contract with 
the owner, and adverse weather conditions). 
I recognize the general contractor has a 
completion date guarantee in his contract with 
the owner that calls for completion on or before 
Nov. 30, 1971. 
In addition to the liquidated damages, I 
agree to pay the general contractor an amount 
equal to his cost in maintaining a field office 
and supervision over the work for each day beyond 
the specified completion date if it is determined 
that I caused this delay, because: I recognize 
-10-
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and agree that the general contractor's costs are 
directly proportional to the length of the con-
struction period, and therefore shall reimburse 
the general contractor for all days beyond the 
specified completion date, whether an extension 
of time is granted or not. 
The validity of a liquidated damage provision is de-
pendent on whether the sum stipulated is deemed liquidated 
damages or a penalty. Parties are bound by a stipulation 
for liquidated damages, but a penalty is unenforceable, 
Russell v. Ogden Union Railroad & Depot Co., 122 Utah 107, 
247 P.2d 257, 263 (1952), and the nondefaulting party is 
left to recovery of the actual damages he can prove. Use Qf 
the terms "liquidated damges" or "penalty" by the parties is 
not controlling, but the provision is to be construed by 
considering all the circumstances at the time the parties 
executed the contract. Croft v. Jensen, 86 Utah 13, 40 P.2d 
198 (1935) . 
In Perkins v. Spencer, 141 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, 447 
(1952), this court examined numerous Utah cases which con-
sidered the matter of liquidated damages and concluded: 
. . .[I]n all cases where the stipulation for 
liquidated damages was enforced it bore some 
reasonable relation to the actual damages which 
could reasonably be anticipated at the time the 
contract was made and was not a forfeiture which 
would allow an unconscionable and exhorbitant re-
covery. (Emphasis added). 
This court also noted itfs agreement with the view summar-
-11-
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ized in the Restatement, Contracts, §339 (1932) : 
(1) An agreement made in advance of breach, 
fixing the damages therefor, is not enforce-
able as a contract and does not affect the 
damages recoverable for the breach, unless 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable 
forecase of just compensation for the harm 
that is caused by the breach, and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach ' 
is one that is incapable or very difficult of 
accurate estimation* 
In the instant case, the contract provision for "liqui-
dated damages" must be held void as a penalty. The actual 
damages caused by delay were capable of accurage calculation, 
and in fact the parties specifically provided for their cal-
culation and payment in paragraph "(p)". At the time the 
parties entered into their agreement they anticipated that 
the damages occasioned by a delay in performance would 
amount to the general contractor's costs in maintaining a 
field office and providing supervision over the work for 
each day beyond the completion date. The parties agreed 
that if Roberts was at fault for the delay he would pay 
these additional costs and expenses. Using this informa-
tion, a court could have easily calculated the amount of 
actual damage occasioned by any delay in performance. The 
provision for the additional payment of $50.00 per day as 
"liquidated damages" does not contemplate any unforeseen 
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damages which would not be fully compensated by the payment 
of the general contractor's costs and expenses* Thus, in 
light of the circumstances and expectations of the parties, 
the "liquidated damages" provision must be construed as an 
additional "penalty" and as such should be held to be void 
and unenforceable. 
It should be noted that the provisions of the first 
paragraph of paragraph "(p)" of the August 9, 1971, contract 
do not necessarily require any real delay by the subcontractor. 
The subcontractor is required to pay Fifty Dollars ($50.00) 
per day regardless of the cause for delay if no extension is 
granted by the general contractor. Under the terms of the 
paragraph extensions of time shall be granted, ". . . when 
asked for in writing, when it is. . . not practical or 
impossible or because of unforeseeable causes beyond control 
and without fault or negligence on my behalf, to complete 
said work in the specified time." Then the contract indi-
cates that such causes include strikes, war, acts of God, 
the Government, the owner, other contractors or the weather. 
The last paragraph of paragraph "(p)" provides that the 
subcontractor will pay actual costs of supervision and field 
office expenses if it is determined that he actually caused 
a delay regardless of whether an extension is granted. 
Thus, under this contract, a subcontractor is absolutely 
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liable for actual damages caused by his delay, regardless of 
any extension granted by the general contractor and, unless 
an extension is granted, he is also liable for Fifty Dollars 
($50.00) per day when delay is caused by acts of God, Govern-
ment or other third parties. This clearly constitutes a 
penalty. 
Paragraph " (q)" of the contract states: "Time required 
to complete this contract will be working days." No 
number is inserted in the blank space. Paragraph "(p)" 
requires the work to be completed " . . . within the time 
stated . . . " and indicates that the general contractor had 
agreed to complete the job by November 30, 1971. There is 
no other time mentioned anywhere in the contract. Paragraph 
"(q)" is obviously included in the contract to provide the 
subcontractor with a maximum number of days in which to 
complete his work. Although the subcontractor has notice of 
the general contractors completion date, he must nevertheless 
be given some specified amount of time in which to complete 
his work. What, for example, would be the result if the 
general contractor did not notify the subcontractor to 
proceed until November 29, 1971? Would the subcontractor 
then be required to pay Fifty Dollars ($50.00) unless a 
written extension was requested and received? 
-l 4-
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II 
THE ERRORS ALLEGED BY THE APPELLANT ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
SUBSTANTIAL OR PREJUDICIAL TO WARRANT A REVERSAL OF THE 
TRIAL COURT AND APPELLANT FAILED TO INTERPOSE TIMELY OB-
JECTIONS TO. THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS. 
The appellant has alleged that the trial judge com-
mitted numerous errors. Many of these alleged errors are 
contained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
filed by the Honorable Judge Croft. For example, appellant 
alleges error in findings 34 and 42 with respect to the 
extent of plaintiff's claim of delay, in finding 36 con-
cerning the omission of fact as to when Roberts was told to 
start work on the Salt Lake shed, in finding 31 concerning 
the amount of precipitation which fell during the disputed 
period, in finding 45 concerning the commencement of work on 
the walls and roof of the sheds by Leger, and other such 
errors. In the interest of economy these errors in the 
findings will be considered together. 
A. Appellant failed to interpose timely objection 
to the alleged errors. 
After the entry of the original findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgments on March 19, 1974, (R. pp. 
27 and 25) appellant filed a motion to amend the findings 
and conclusions and to enter an amended judgment (R. pp. 
21-22). The only error mentioned in this motion, concerns ^ 
•:•'•• ; H 
-15-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the amount of delay claimed by Leger (R. p. 21) . With the 
exception of this one alleged error, the remaining errors 
which appellant now raises were never presented or brought 
to the trial court's attention. 
This court, on numerous occasions, has held that a 
party must give the trial court an opportunity to correct 
alleged error before asking for and receiving a reversal 
in a reviewing court. E.g., Drummond v. Union Pac. R.R., 
111 Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903, 909 (1947); Hube.r v. Newman, 
106 Utah 363, 145 P.2d 780, 782-83 (1944); Porcupine 
Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Co., 15 Utah 2d 318, 392 
P.2d 620, 621 (1964). If the objections urged on appeal 
were not urged in the trial court, this court has refused 
to consider them absent a showing of special circumstances. 
Steele v. Wilkinson, 10 Utah 2d 159, 349 P.2d 1117, 1119 
(1960); Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185, 
186 (1954). 
In Keller v. Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255 P.2d 118 (1953) 
defendant appealed from an adverse judgment in a partner-
ship dissolution and accounting contest contending that the 
court had erred in not particularly specifying certain 
items in its findings of fact. The defendant proposed 
certain amendments to the findings but advanced different 
-1 £_ 
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exceptions on appeal. In refusing to review the appellant's 
new exceptions this court stated: 
If these items had been brought to the 
attention of the trial court at the proper 
time, a proper correction, if called for, 
would no doubt have been made. Defendant, 
however, not only made no objections to the 
findings before they were signed, but he 
raised none of these questions in his motion 
for a new trial. Hence, he cannot now be 
permitted to criticize the findings for ambi-
guity, inexplicity, or uncertainty., [cita-
tions omitted]. Such objections, now made 
on appeal, come too late. 255 P.2d at 119. 
Similarly, in Westerfield v. Coop, 6 Utah 2d 262, 311 
P.2d 787, 787-88 (1957) where appeal was from a judgment 
for back alimony and support money which had been awarded 
in a California divorce decree, this court announced: 
The Utah court took it upon itself to 
make findings apportioning the California 
judgment among the plaintiff and 3 children 
equally, though the California court had 
awarded an unapportioned monthly lump sum. 
There was no seasonable objection directed 
toward said finding, and we will not enter-
tain such objection for the first time on 
appeal. 
The only recognized exception to this rule is where 
the appellant had no opportunity to make an objection or 
amendment at the trial level. In the instant case, appel-
lant not only had the opportunity to object, but specifi-
cally filed a motion to amend the court's findings. In 
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light of these facts, appellant has waived any right to seek 
a reversal in this court on grounds which were not properly 
raised or presented in the trial court. 
B. Failure to move for new trial precludes review of 
the errors. 
A second ground necessitating a refusal to review 
appellant's alleged errors is the failure of appellant to 
seek a new trial in the lower court. Pursuant to Rule 59, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may seek a new trial 
by filing a motion within 10 days after the entry of judg-
ment. In an action tried without a jury, the court may open 
the judgment, take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, make new findings and direct 
the entry of a new judgment. Among other grounds, Rule 59 
specifically recognizes "insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify a decision" and "error in law," as sufficient cause 
for the granting of a new trial. The rule serves an import-
ant policy; it enables the trial court to review the evidence 
and his conclusions with respect thereto, when the evidence 
is still fresh, thus providing a more accurate and mean-
ingful evaluation of the facts. Moreover, the motion 
preserves the integrity of the trial court by encouraging 
a self-induced correction of error. 
-1 8-
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In Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n,, 24 Utah 2d 292, 
470 P.2d 393, 396-97 (1970) this court held that plaintiffls 
failure to move for a new trial, so that the trial court 
could correct the verdict rendered by the jury, precluded a 
review of the verdict in the appellate court. In so holding, 
this court saw the scope of its review in examining the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict as one to 
review the actions of the trial court, not the jury, and to 
review only those issues raised below. While appellate 
courts are usually more willing to review decisions of the 
trier of fact when that function is occupied by a judge 
rather than by a jury, the reviewing court should not pass 
judgment on the evidence when the alleged error has not been 
called to the judge's attention by a proper motion. The 
trial judge is in a preferred position to weigh the facts, 
and determinations concerning the evidence should be pre-
sented to the trial court before a reviewing court is called 
on to make its evaluation of the evidence. Many of Utah's 
neighboring jurisdictions have recognized this aspect of 
judicial restraint and have refused to review questions 
concerning the sufficiency of evidence to support findings 
of fact absent a motion for new trial in the court below. 
E.g., Andrews v. Hand, 190 Kan. 109, 372 P.2d 559, 562 
-19-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cert, denied, 371 U.S. 880 (1962); Hyre v. Pratt, 382 P.2d 
18, 21 (Okla. 1963); Noice v. Jorgensen, 151 Colo. 459, 378 
P.2d 834, 837 (1963); Bushard v. Washoe County, 68 Nev. 217, 
229 P.2d 156, 157 (1951). Since the appellant made no motion 
for new trial and gave the trial court no opportunity to 
correct the alleged errors, this court should not seek to 
review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the find-
ings. 
£• The decision of the trial court on the evidence 
should be sustained. 
Even if this court should determine that a review of 
the evidence and findings is proper, an examination of the 
evidence will lead this court to the conclusion that the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were not erroneous. 
Previously, this court had announced the rule that because 
of the trial court's advantaged position, substantial de-
ference must be given to its findings with respect to 
the evidence. E.g., First Sec. Bank v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 
24, 504 P.2d 995, 996 (1972); Elton v. Utah State Retire-
ment Bd., 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972); Peterson v. 
Holloway, 8 Utah 2d 328, 334 P.2d 559, 561-62 (1959). In 
Nokes v. Continental Min. & Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 
P. 2d 954, 954-55 (1957) this court was called upon to re-
view a question of fact in an equity matter. In doing so, 
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this court said: 
Where there is a conflict in the evidence, 
the finding of the trial court will not be dis-
turbed if the evidence preponderates in favor 
of the finding; nor, if the evidence thereon is 
evenly balanced or if is doubtful where the pre-
ponderance lies; nor, even if its weight is 
slightly against the finding of the trial court, 
but it will be overturned and another finding 
made only if the evidence clearly preponderates 
against his finding. 
The rule just stated is based upon the sound 
reasoning that some credit should be indulged in 
favor of the findings of the trial court because 
of the advantages peculiar to his position in im-
mediate contract with the trial. It is indeed 
often true that, "the manner hath more eloquence 
than naked words portend." There are intangibles 
of expression and attitude which give color and 
meaning not apparent from words alone. The trial 
judge feels the impact of the personalities of 
the parties and the witnesses: He is able to ob-
serve their appearance and behavior; their forth-
rightness or hesitancy in answering; their frank-
ness and candor, or lack of it. Similarly re-
vealing to him are indications of surprise, anger, 
resentment or vindictiveness, pleasure or other 
emotions which may be discerned from expressions 
of the countenance or voice. He also has some 
advantage in appraising their abilities to under-
stand and their capacities to remember. Further-
more, he is in a position to question the witness 
himself to clarify doubtful points or verify his 
impressions on the matters just mentioned. All 
of this combines to afford him better insight as 
to the truthfulness of the testimony offered than 
does a persual of the cold record. It is a sound 
and well recognized policy of the law to repose 
some confidence in the verity of the actions of 
the trial court, and not to interfere with them 
unless it clearly appears that he is in error. 
Applying this principal, this court has upheld the trial 
court findings unless clearly against the weight of the evi-
-21-
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dence, Harthy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28, 
29 (1972), where they were supported by clear, satisfactory, 
and convincing proof, Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 
367 P.2d 464,. 468 (1962); Martin v. Martin, 29 Utah 2d 413, 
510 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1973), where bolstered by substantial 
evidence and reasonable inference, Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 
2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142, 1145 (1973), and where they were 
founded on competent evidence, Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 
2d 370, 510 P.2d 526, 527 (1973). 
These same standards for review have also been applied 
in situations involving contract disputes. In Casey v. 
Nelson Bros. Const. Co., 24 Utah 2d 14, 465 P.2d 173, 174 
(1970) where plaintiff recovered a judgment for the balance 
due on a subcontract with the defendant, the defendant 
sought to attack the judgment on grounds that the evidence 
did not support the court's findings. Responding to this 
contention this court said: 
The answers to the defendant's contentions 
are found in the so-often repeated rule: that 
where there is dispute in the evidence we assume 
that the trial court believed those aspects of 
the evidence, and drew the inferences which could 
fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom, which 
tend to support the findings and judgment; and 
that upon our review of the record in that light, 
if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to 
support them they will not be disturbed. 
In Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, infra, defendant con-
-22-
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tended that the evidence "compelled" a finding for the de-
fendant on his claim of breach of warranty. In rejecting 
this contention this court said: 
[I]t would not be sufficient that there is 
merely some evidence which would support such 
a finding. Only if the evidence is such that 
all reasonable minds would be so persuaded 
would we reverse the trial court and rule as 
a matter of law that a warranty was given and 
breached. Conversely, if there is any basis 
in the evidence upon which the trial court 
could fairly and reasonably remain unconvinced 
of those facts, the refusal to so find must 
be sustained. 
This court chose not to look at select testimony in isolation 
but instead chose to "survey it in composite with all of 
the evidence in the case". 417 P.2d at 135. In light of 
all the evidence, the court found the defendant's position 
to be unsupported. 
Finally in Staples Excavation & Erection Co. v. Wehyer 
Const. Co., 26 Utah 2d 387, 490 P.2d 330, 333 (1971) where 
plaintiff sought to recover the value of labor and materials 
furnished in the construction of an office building, the 
trial court made findings in which it concluded that plain-
tiff had failed to prove that its costs were reasonable and 
so it dismissed the complaint. Both plaintiff and defendant 
sought review and the appellant contended that the court had 
erred in disregarding uncontested testimony and that the re-
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cord did not support the findings of the court. In consider-
ing these contentions this court recognized that it was 
"asked to review issues of fact rather than issues of law", 
but concluded that the trial court could reasonably and 
fairly have been convinced in its findings and so refused to 
upset the lower court's findings unless they were "arbitrary" 
or without any "basis in the record". Because the evidence 
was in conflict the Staples court held: "The decision of 
the trial court having been made upon disputed and contra-
dictory evidence, it would appear that the rule we have un-
undated in numerous cases, that the trial court being in an 
advantaged position from having heard the testimony of the 
witnesses and observed their demeanor is better able to 
determine issues of fact than is this court upon a written 
record." In like fashion, this court should uphold the 
findings of the trial court below, because at worst the 
evidence is in dispute. 
There was substantial evidence introduced at trial to 
support the findings of the trial court. 
Even if appellant should be permitted to raise objec-
tions on appeal which were not raised in the court below, 
and even if this court should permit a review of those ob-
jections, despite appellant's failure to move for a new trial 
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and permit correction at the trial level, this court must 
conclude that the evidence produced at trial, when evaluated 
in light of the standards and preferences established by 
this court, was sufficient to sustain the trial court's 
findings and conclusions. 
In finding number 44, the court below found that Leger 
had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the failure to complete the work within the time speci-
fied was due to the fault or negligence of the defendant. 
Appellant contends that this was error because the "fault or 
negligence" standard went to the criteria for determining an 
extension of time and not to the issue of breach of con-
tract. Again, this argument misses the point. Admittedly, 
the failure to perform a binding contractual promise results 
in a breach of contract, I Restatement, Contracts §1 (1932), 
but the words of the agreement must be interpreted to un-
cover the promises which are exchanged and bargained for. 
The words of the whole agreement reflect the intentions of 
the private bargaining parties; it is this intention which a 
court of law must search out and enforce. By the terms of 
the agreement between the parties in the instant case, it 
was agreed that any delays which were not due to the fault 
or negligence of Roberts would warrant an extension of time. 
The parties in their agreement contemplated that innocent 
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delay would not cause injury to either party and would be 
permissible. When the trial court found that Leger had not 
proved that the delay was due to the fault or negligence of 
Roberts, it was, in essence, finding that any delay attri-
butable to Roberts was of a kind which the parties had 
previously agreed to as being permissible. Leger could not, 
on the one hand, claim that innocent delay was justification 
for damages, and on the other hand, admit by the terms of 
its own agreement that the same innocent delay would have 
warranted an extension of time. Therefore, the finding of 
the trial court was not error but was extremely meaningful 
and material in light of the nature of the agreement between 
the parties. 
Appellant contends that Finding of Fact number 39 (R. 
p. 38) is irrelevant and incompetent. This finding was 
based upon the testimony of George Leger to the effect that 
the installation of radiant heating pads at plaintiff's road 
shed job in Lehi took the same amount of time as defendant's 
installation at Salt Lake and Manila. Appellant's argument 
overlooks the fact that plaintiff elicited testimony from 
George Leger based upon his "experience" as to how long it 
should have taken to install the radiant heating pads in 
question (Tr. 1st day, p. 11-12) . Thus, the basis of his 
expertise was a legitimate subject of cross-examination and 
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the time required on other jobs, a legitimate subject of 
inquiry. 
George Leger's testimony demonstrates that construction 
of the heating pads at the Lehi shed, which was identical or 
substantially similar to the Manila and Salt Lake sheds, did 
not progress at a faster pace than did the construction at 
Manila and Salt Lake. The testimony was within the scope of 
the witness1s "expertise" and it illuminated the questions 
of delay and responsibility for the delay. 
Proof of the existence of other facts, the occurrence 
of other events, or acts or conduct upon other occasions 
which have a relevant and material bearing upon the fact in 
issue is admissable, Firlotte v. Jessee, 172 P.2d 710, 
76 C.A.2d 207 (1946), and the admission of such evidence 
is a matter which rests largely in the trial courtfs dis-
cretion. Coyswell v. C. C. Anderson Stores Co., 68 Idaho 
205, 192 P.2d 383, 389 (1948); See, Panitz v. Orenge, 518 
P.2d 726, 10 Wash.App. 317 (1973). A trial judge's deter-
mination should not be reversed absent a showing of abuse 
of discretion. Frame v. Bauman, 449 P.2d 525, 530, 202 Kan. 
461 (1969). 
In a related context, this court has allowed testimony 
of a sales manager concerning the warranty policy of a tire 
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seller as having probative value on the issue of the exis-
tence of a warranty in a particular sale. Super Tire 
Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132, 135 
(1966). In other contexts, this court has allowed the 
introduction of evidence concerning the value of reasonably 
comparable or sufficiently similar property when the value 
of other property is in dispute. E.g., Sweeny v. Happy 
Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126, 129-30 (1966); 
Salt Lake City v. Lewis, 30 Utah 2d 462, 519 P.2d 1344, 1345 
(1974); see, Salt Lake County v. Kazura, 22 Utah 2d 313, 452 
P.2d 869, 870-71 (1969). Even if testimony concerning work 
at the Lehi shed was circumstantial, such testimony can be 
used alone or with direct evidence to support a judgment. 
E.g., Rothman v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 7 Wash.App. 453, 
500 P.2d 1288, 1290 (1972); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 
418 P.2d 900, 917 (Oka. 1965). It should be noted that no 
objection was made at trial to this testimony (Tr. 1st day, 
pp. 58-59). Appellant should not be allowed to raise his 
objection to the admission of evidence for the first time at 
this stage in the proceedings. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evi-
dence, specifically provides: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a) 
there appears of record objection to the 
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evidence timely interposed and so stated as 
to make clear the specific ground of objec-
tion,, and (b) the court which passes upon 
the effect of the error or errors is of the 
opinion that the admitted evidence should 
have been excluded on the ground stated and 
probably had a substantial influence in 
bringing about the verdict or finding. How-
ever, the court in its discretion, and in 
the interests of justice, may review the 
erroneous admission of evidence even though 
the grounds of the objection thereto are not 
correctly stated. (Emphasis added). 
The appellant neither objected to the introduction of the 
evidence nor sought to amend the findings of fact with re-
spect thereto. Even if a timely objection had been raised, 
the error, if any, would at most be harmless. See Startin v. 
Madsen, 130 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834, 836 (1951). 
In the interest of conserving time and space, respondent 
will briefly indicate the portions of the record which support 
the Findings of Fact which appellant disputes. 
Finding of Fact number 34 - Transcript 1st day, pp. 
67-68. 
Finding of Fact number 35 - Transcript 1st day, pp. 
50. 
Finding of Fact number 36 - Transcript 2nd day, pp. 
42-43, 46; pp. 74-76. 
Finding of Fact number 37 - Exhibits, 17-P, 18-P and 
19-P. 
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Finding of Fact number 41 - Exhibit 46-P; Transcript 
2nd day, pp. 37-38. 
Finding of Fact number 42 - Transcript 1st day, pp. 64-
67. 
Finding of Fact number 43 - Transcript 1st day, p. 50, 
p. 12. 
Finding of Fact number 45 - Exhibit 12-D, Transcript 
1st day, pp. 64-68. 
Finding of Fact number 46 - Transcript 2nd day, pp. 42-
43, 46, 74-75. 
Finding of Fact number 47 states that "Leger did not 
establish the number of calendar days of delay, if any, 
caused by Roberts on the Salt Lake road shed." A review of 
the record shows a lack of evidence on this point. 
Ill . 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S 
FEES. 
In its amended judgment, the trial court awarded Roberts 
the amount of $2,607.50 for attorney's fees. The fees were 
assessed pursuant to U.C.A. §14-1-8 which provides: 
In any action brought upon either of the bonds 
provided herein, or against the public body 
failing to obtain the delivery of the payment 
bond, the prevailing party, upon each separate 
cause of action, shall recover a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be taxed as costs. (Empha-
sis added). 
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As found by the court, the instant action fell within the 
scope of §14-1-8 and since Roberts was the prevailing party, 
the court awarded it reasonable attorney's fees. 
Appellant does not dispute the applicability of this 
statute nor the reasonableness of the fee assessed. The 
only contentions of the appellant are (1) that the fee was 
improperly assessed as part of the judgment rather than as 
a cost of suit, and (2) that the court made no finding that 
Roberts was the "prevailing" party. 
The obvious intent of the legislature in enacting 
Section 14-1-8 was to provide adequate compensation to a 
successful party who was forced to sue for the recovery of 
payments due under a prime contract. Without the recovery 
of attorney's fees, the successful subcontractor would only 
recover an amount equal to his contract price less his at-
torney's fees, thereby substantially reducing the value of 
his bargain under the contract. 
Since the purpose of Section 14-1-8 is to provide "just 
compensation", it should make little difference whether 
attorney's fees are assessed as part of the judgment or as 
costs. In either event, the fee must be paid by the losing 
party to fully compensate the subcontractor. To rely on 
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meaningless distinctions between "costs" and "judgments" in 
the instant case would serve no useful purpose. The only 
meaningful question is the reasonableness of such fee which 
appellant does not dispute. 
Appellant has relied on Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, in support of its proposition that, as 
costs, the fees were not included in defendant's memorandum 
of costs and should be disallowed. In Walker Bank and Trust 
Co. v. New York Terminal Warehouse Co., 10 Utah 2d 210, 350 
P.2d 626, 630-31 (I960), this court disallowed costs to a 
plaintiff who failed to file a "verified" memorandum of 
costs within five (5) days as required by the rule. In the 
instant case, the defendant filed his verified memorandum of 
costs on March 19, 1975 (R. pp. 42-43), the same day judgment 
was entered (R. pp. 25-26). The findings of fact and con-
clusions of law were amended to include attorney's fees on 
May 23, 1974 (R. pp. 15-16), when the amended judgment was 
also entered (R. pp. 8-10). The amended judgment was rendered 
after hearing pursuant to defendant's motion (R. pp. 23-24) 
requesting a finding and judgment relating to attorney's 
fees. Defendant claimed that the court had overlooked the 
provisions of Section 41-1-8 and the court agreed. Testimony 
and an exhibit regarding attorney's fees was presented at 
the trial (Tr. 2nd day, p. 129, Tr. 3rd day, pp. 1-5; Ex. 
43-D). 
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The purpose of Rule 54(d)(2) is twofold: (1) to re-
lieve the trial court of the burden of taking testimony from 
all parties in every case as to those items customarily 
awarded as costs, viz., filing fees, costs of service of 
complaints, subpoenas, etc., and (2) to give the party 
against whom costs are awarded an opportunity to have those 
items presented to the court under oath and subject to 
challenge. It is customary for those entitled to and seeking 
attorney's fees in Utah courts to present their claim at 
trial by way of sworn testimony as was done in this case. 
Appellant was entitled to and did cross examine defendant's 
witness. Appellant would then have this testimony repeated 
in the memorandum of costs. This procedure would unduly bur-
den the trial court and burden the record on appeal with du-
plicate written and oral testimony. 
As a second ground for the denial of attorney's fees, 
appellant contends that the trial court made no finding 
that the defendant was the "prevailing party" under Section 
14-1-8, and that, since certain offsets were awarded to the 
appellant, both parties were "prevailing parties". In sup-
port of this position, appellant relies on the decision 
of Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 (1966) 
where this court refused to reverse the decision of the 
trial judge with respect to the award of attorney's fees 
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under U.C.A. §§38-1-17 to 18. This court in Shupe, how-
ever, did not base its decision on the fact that plaintiff 
was not a prevailing party, but instead said: "Viewing the 
overall picture of this case in the light most favorable to 
the facts as found by the jury and to the verdict and judg-
ment, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion 
in rejecting defendant's contentions." (Emphasis added). 
Id. 417 P.2d at 249. 
A finding that defendant was the prevailing party is 
certainly implicit in finding of fact number 52 (R. p. 16) 
which indicates that defendant was entitled to attorney's 
fees under the provisions of §14-1-8. 
The decision to award attorney's fees pursuant to an 
authorizing statute is one which lies in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. This court has refused to reverse 
the trial court's decision with respect to a reasonable 
attorney's fee in the absence of abuse of that discretion. 
In re Smith's Estate, 162 P.2d 105, 111 108 Utah 537 (1945). 
Costs and attorney's fees are assumed to be reasonable unless 
there is clear evidence to the contrary. See Jenkins v. 
Jenkins, 153 P.2d 262, 264-65, 107 Utah 239 (1944). In the 
case below, the defendant was awarded judgment on its first 
claim contained in the counterclaim, while plaintiff's claim 
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was denied. Even though certain set-offs were awarded to 
the plaintiff, it was in the trial court's sound discretion 
to hold that, as a whole, the defendant was the prevailing 
party. The fact that defendant was not entitled to recover 
the full amount of its claim does not preclude the trial 
court from finding that it had nevertheless prevailed. 
Appellant relies on the decision of Malvo v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973) for the proposi-
tion that fees should not be awarded where to do so would 
result in a penalty. The Malvo court, however, did not 
say that the award of attorney's fees should be voided as 
a penalty, but only that the automatic award of attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party is "manifestly unreasonable". 
Id. at 587. In fact, the Malvo court reiterated that "a 
party does not have to prevail on all of the issues in the 
case to be a 'prevailing party1" [citations omitted] Id. 
at 586. The court also bolstered its prior rulings which 
recognized the wide discretion of the trial judge in the 
award of attorney's fees. Id. The main concern of the 
Malvo court was to insure that when attorney's fees are 
awarded they are "reasonable" and properly awarded as 
"partial compensation" to the prevailing party. While 
holding that the fees awarded in the lower court were 
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not compensatory, the court did state that: 
Where there is evidence that a losing party 
did not have a good faith claim or defense, 
and all the fees incurred by the prevailing 
party were justified, a judge might well 
choose to award the full amount of the fees 
requested. 512 P.2d at 588. 
It is clear that in the case below, the award of 
attorney's fees was justified as partial compensation for 
the recovery of the payments due to the defendant. These 
fees were reasonable, just and undisputed; they should be 
allowed in accordance with the statute under which they 
were assessed, 
IV 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY DID NOT FILE A 
NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME AND MANNER PRE-
SCRIBED BY LAW AND IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT AS A PARTY 
APPELLANT. 
The appellant represents that those parties seeking 
relief in this proceeding are "[p]laintiff and plaintiff for 
and on behalf of its surety." (Appellant's brief, p. 2). 
Yet, the only party that has preserved its right to appeal 
is Leger Construction Company, for only Leger has filed a 
notice of appeal. 
Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, establishes 
the procedure for taking an appeal. This rule permits an 
appeal "from a district court to the Supreme Court" within 
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"one month from the entry of judgment or order appealed 
from." (Emphasis added). The only exception from compliance 
with this time limitation is "a showing of excusable neglect 
based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the 
judgment." (Emphasis added). The rule goes on to say that 
"a party may appeal from a judgment by filing with the district 
court a notice of appeal . . * and depositing therewith the 
fee required for docketing the appeal in the Supreme Court." 
(Emphasis added). Subpart (b) of Rule 73 sets forth the re-
quirements of the notice which "shall specify the parties 
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or part there-
of appealed from; and shall designate that the appeal is 
taken to the Supreme Court" (Emphasis added). Notification 
of the filing by serving a copy thereof "on all the parties 
to the judgment" is also required. This rule serves to in-
form the court and an adverse party of the pendency of an 
appeal and, in particular, of those parties that are making 
the appeal. 
The judgment of the district court was "joint and several" 
as against Leger Construction Company and its surety United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Corporation (USF&G). Each party 
had an opportunity to appeal the judgment by complying with 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice of appeal 
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which was filed by Leger on June 25, 1974, states in full: 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Leger Construc-
tion, Inc., and hereby appeals to the Utah Su-
preme Court the Amended Judgment entered herein 
on the 23rd day of May, 1974, and all proceed-
ings thereafter up to the filing of this Notice 
of Appeal. 
The verb tense of this notice is in the singular and clearly 
indicates that only one party sought appeal. Even the cap-
tion of the notice fails to designate United States Fidelity 
and Guaranty Company as an appellant. This notice fails to 
indicate that any other party, except Leger, was making an 
appeal. 
The timely filing of an appeal is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite, E.g., Allen v. Garner, 45 Utah 39, 143 P.228 (1914); 
Sorenson v. Korsgaard, 83 Utah 177, 27 P.2d 439 (1933), as 
is the filing of a proper and sufficient notice of appeal, 
E.g. Johnston v. Geary, 84 Utah 47, 33 P.2d 757 (1934); 
Anderson v. Halthusen Mercantile Co., 30 Utah 31, 83 P* 560 
(1906). In this case USF&G has not filed a notice of appeal 
and is bound by the judgment below. This court has no juris-
diction to rule with respect to USF&G's liability to Roberts. 
[See, 9 Moore's Federal Practice, 1(203.09 for discussion of 
the requirement of filing notice as jurisdictional and manda-
tory to preserve appeal]. 
While there is apparently no Utah decision which dis-
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cusses the precise question now before the court, this court's 
language in Allen v. Garner, supra, is illuminating and 
should serve as a guide for decision. In Allen, the appel-
lant failed to serve notice on a joint maker and defendant 
of a note upon which judgment was rendered. This court held 
there that the notice of appeal requirement was jurisdictional, 
and said: 
The question that confronts us here, how-
ever, is, Can parties confer jurisdiction upon 
this court to hear appeals by waiving notice of 
appeal or by entering their appearance at any 
time after the time for an appeal has expired? 
If the question is one merely of regularity or 
jurisdiction over the person, then, of course, 
we might permit an omitted party to enter his 
appearance at any time before the case is finally 
submitted, but if it is jurisdictional in the 
sense that it affects the power of this court 
to hear and determine the appeal, then, as a mat-
ter of course, the parties cannot confer juris-
diction by consent. We think the question is 
jurisdictional in the sense just stated. 143 
P.2d at 229. 
Other state courts that have examined the jurisdictional 
issue of a party's failure to file a notice of appeal agree 
that such a failure precludes an appellate court's jurisdic-
tion. In Hayes v. Hagemuir, 75 N.M.70, 400 P.2d 945 (1963) 
a minor and her mother were denied relief in an action for 
personal injuries. Only the minor filed a notice of appeal 
which was singular in form and only mentioned the minor as 
appellant. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction 
-3 9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to hear the appeal as it applied to the mother. In Sloan v. 
Sheridan, 161 Kan. 425, 168 P.2d 545 (1946) one of two de-
fendants filed a notice of appeal, but judgment was rendered 
against both of them, and plaintiff caused the judgment to 
be executed against the defendant who did not file notice of 
appeal. The court held that the notice was not sufficient 
to constitute a notice o>f appeal for both defendants, and 
that the plaintiff was authorized in his attempt to execute 
the judgment against the defendant who had not filed notice. 
The Federal courts are also in agreement with this 
position. In Cook and Sons Equipment, Inc. v. Killen, 277 F 
607, 609 (9th Cir. 1960), where only the corporate defendant 
and not the individual defendants filed a notice of appeal, 
the court refused to grant the individual defendant's motion 
to have their names added to the notice of appeal on the 
ground that the omission was a "clerical error". The court 
said: 
The omission here was much more than a 
clerical error. It was a failure of the in-
dividual defendants to appeal. We have no 
authority to amend a notice of appeal so as 
to bring in additional parties. Appellant 
relies on Rule 75(h) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. That rule has 
no application in the instant situation. It 
applies to errors in the contents of a record. 
Rule 73(b) requires that the notice of appeal 
specify the parties taking the appeal. Only 
the parties named in the notice of appeal are 
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brought within the appellate court's jur-
isdiction. VII Moore, Federal Practice 
(2d ed. 1955) §§73.13, 73.14. The harmless 
error doctrine has no application of failure 
to name parties in a notice of appeal. Pen-
well v. Newland, 9 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 551. 
The motion to amend the notice of appeal so 
as to include additional parties is denied. 
In Van Hoose v. Edison, 450 F.2d 746, 747 (6th Cir. 
1971), where a group of students appealed from an order 
denying them relief from a suspension for violations of the 
school "Student and Employee Hair Code," the Notice of 
Appeal was entitled "Floyd Van Hoose, et al.M. The court 
refused to recognize any other party other than Van Hoose as 
properly before the court saying, 
We are satisfied that the only appellant 
in this case is Floyd Van Hoose. Rule 3(c) , 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires in part: 
"The notice of appeal shall specify the party 
or parties taking the appeal." The only party 
specified in the notice of appeal filed in this 
case was Floyd Van Hoose. The term "et al" does 
not inform any other party or any court as to 
which of the plaintiffs desire to appeal in this 
case. This is more than a clerical error. Cook 
and Soons Equipment, Inc. v. Killen, 277 F.2d 
607 (9th Cir., 1960); Penwell v. Newland, 180 
F.2d 551 (9th Cir., 1950); 9 Moorefs Federal 
Practice (2nd Ed. 1970) Section 203.17. 
And, in McKinney v. Debord, 507 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1974) a 
group of defendants appealed from an adverse summary judg-
ment but only one defendant, McKinney, actually signed the 
notice of appeal. The court dismissed the appeal with 
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respect to the other defendants because they had not signed. 
Finally, it is too late for plaintiff to seek the 
joinder of USF&G under Rule 74(a), U.R.C.P.. That rule 
applies only to parties who have otherwise taken steps to 
preserve their appeal. The Compilerfs Notes to Rule 74(a) 
indicate that the rule was patterned after Rule 74 of the 
Federal Rules, now Rule 3(b) of the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure. In commenting on Rule 3(b), Moore states: 
Only a party who hcis filed a timely notice of 
appeal may join in the appeal of another. . . . 
Rule 3(b) does not permit one who has not filed 
a timely notice of appeal to become an appellant 
by joining in appeal with one who has filed a 
timely notice. 
9, Moore's Federal Practice, 1(203.13 (1974). 
Only Leger Construction Company is a proper party 
before this court and the judgment of the district court 
with respect to the liability of USF&G is binding. This 
court is without jurisdiction to upset that judgment as it 
applies to USF&G. Only Leger has satisfied the jurisdic-
tional requirement of filing a proper notice of appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Findings of Fact 
entered by the trial court are fully supported by competent 
evidence and that the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed. The appellant failed to raise substantially 
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all of the issues before the trial court which it seeks 
to present here and under well-established principles of 
law these matters should not be brought before this court 
for the first time on appeal. It is further submitted that 
added defendant United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company 
has not appealed from the judgment of the trial court and 
that the judgment heretofore entered against it is final in 
all respects. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
R. Mont McDowell 
ROE AND FOWLER 
34 0 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
-43-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
